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THE ROLE OF GUARANTEES IN BANK LENDING 
 
By Alberto Franco Pozzolo* 
 
Abstract 
Guarantees play an important role in debt contracts. They alter the risk for the 
lender, transform borrowers’ incentives and, possibly, modify the equilibrium 
allocation of financial resources. This paper studies the role of guarantees on bank 
loans, using a sample of over 50,000 individual lines of credit granted by Italian 
banks. Two empirical models are used. The first directly verifies the relationship 
between ex-ante publicly available information on borrowers’ default riskiness and 
the presence of guarantees on their bank loans; the second compares the interest rates 
charged on secured and unsecured loans made by different banks to the same 
borrower, thus perfectly controlling for idiosyncratic riskiness and singling out the 
direct effect of the presence of guarantees on credit risk. The empirical results show 
that real guarantees (physical assets or equities that the lender can sell if the borrower 
defaults), which are often internal, are mainly used to provide a priority to some 
creditors. Personal guarantees (contractual obligations of third parties to make 
payments in case of default, e.g. suretyships), which can only be external, are used 
instead as incentive devices against moral hazard problems. Controlling for 
borrowers’ characteristics, both real and personal guarantees reduce ex-ante credit 
risk. 
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1.Introduction1 
A large number of bank loans are backed by collateral or guarantees.2 Berger and 
Udell (1990) report that in the United States nearly 70 per cent of all commercial and 
industrial loans are made on a secured basis. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Binks et 
al. (1988) report similar or even higher ratios for Germany and the United Kingdom, 
respectively. 
The consequences of warranty requirements for the availability of bank 
financing have been examined in numerous theoretical and empirical studies. 
Information asymmetries in bank relationships can significantly alter the allocation of 
credit with respect to what would be socially optimal (i.e. all projects with a positive 
net present value − NPV − would be financed; see, e.g., de Meza and Webb, 1987). 
Warranties may help to alleviate these distortions by reducing moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. They transform borrowers’ incentives, alter the risks for 
the banks and eventually modify the equilibrium credit allocation. Smith and Warner 
(1979), for example, argue that “the issuance of secured debt lowers the total cost of 
borrowing by controlling the incentive for stockholders to take projects that reduce 
the value of the firm”; Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that in some cases recourse to 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Ugo Albertazzi, Allen Berger, Dario Focarelli, Andrea Generale, Giorgio 
Gobbi, Leonardo Gambacorta, Luigi Guiso, Simonetta Iannotti, Luigi Leva, Paolo Mistrulli, Fabio 
Panetta, Carmine Panzella, Bruno Parigi, Loriana Pellizzon, Salvatore Rossi, Stefano Siviero, Gregory 
Udell and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the University of Padua, the XIV Australasian 
Finance and Banking Conference and Ente Luigi Einaudi for their comments and suggestions, and 
Cinzia Chini and Stefania De Mitri for helping me through the data-bases. I alone am responsible for 
any remaining errors. I carried out most of this research while I was an economist at the Research 
Department of the Bank of Italy. Address for correspondence: Università del Molise, Dipartimento 
SEGES, via De Sanctis, 86100 Campobasso, Italy. E-Mail: pozzolo@unimol.it. 
2 There is no complete agreement in the literature on the definitions of guarantee and collateral. In 
the following I will use: a) guarantee for contractual obligations of a third party to make payments in 
case of default of the borrower (e.g. a suretyship), b) collateral for physical assets or a securities – 
posted either by the borrower or by a third party – which the lender can realize in case of default and c) 
warranty as a generic word indicating indifferently collateral and guarantees. 
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secured debt may make it possible to finance positive NPV projects that otherwise 
would not be financed. 
However, warranties can also introduce new inefficiencies in credit allocation. 
For example, banks might devote less resources to screening and monitoring projects 
financed with secured loans, as the warranties themselves help to reduce credit risk 
(see, e.g., Manove et al., 2000). Consequently, if banks are more qualified than the 
average investor to evaluate projects, credit allocation may be less efficient when a 
larger proportion of loans is made on a secured basis. Moreover, if banks find it less 
expensive to require warranties than to monitor projects, investors who cannot 
provide them possibly may not be financed, even if the NPV of their investment is 
positive. Further, additional distortions might be introduced if some banks, observing 
warranty demands of other institutions, free-ride on their auditing activity. As shown 
by Rajan and Winton (1995), this may lead to sub-optimal monitoring. 
One of the crucial issues in the analysis of secured bank lending is whether 
secured debt is requested at safer or riskier borrowers. This question has been 
answered in different ways in the light of the predictions of theoretical models, the 
conventional wisdom among bankers, and the results of econometric analyses. This 
paper provides some additional empirical evidence on the relationship between risk 
and warranties on bank loans, using high quality data on over 50,000 individual lines 
of credit granted by a large sample of Italian banks. It arrives at two main findings. 
First, borrowers with higher ex-ante probability of default are more likely to be 
required to post guarantees – which can only be offered by an external grantor – but 
not collateral – which is typically owned by the borrower. Second, controlling for 
borrowers’ risk, secured loans carry lower rates than unsecured loans. This result is 
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novel to the literature,3 but it is consistent with the predictions of a large body of 
theoretical research and with the received view within the banking community. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly 
summarizes the theoretical and empirical results of the literature on the relationship 
between borrowers’ risk and secured bank loans. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses 
under scrutiny and the empirical models adopted. Section 4 describes the data used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 
6 concludes. 
2.Risk and warranties on bank loans 
2.1 Theoretical results 
The predictions of the theoretical literature on the relationship between risk and 
warranties strongly depend on the informational framework adopted.4 Following the 
seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), many models have been developed 
that assume that banks cannot observe borrowers’ characteristics, so that the average 
interest rate on loans is higher than the rate that would be optimal for safe borrowers, 
if they could be identified. This creates an adverse selection problem, because only 
riskier borrowers apply for bank loans. In the original model, the equilibrium entails 
some degree of credit rationing. However, a possible alternative is to allow loan 
applicants to use warranties as a signaling device: by providing them, safer borrowers 
can credibly show their characteristics. Banks can therefore screen applicants by their 
degree of riskiness, offering better credit conditions to the safer ones. In this 
framework, secured loans are always those made to the safer borrowers, as shown by 
Bester (1985 and 1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987). 
                                                 
3 One notable exception is Harhoff and Körting (1998). However, these authors do not expand in 
their finding. 
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The positive relationship between borrowers’ riskiness and the presence of 
warranties on bank loans is a general result in models where they are used as a 
signaling device. Theoretical models where secured loans are made to riskier 
borrowers typically build on different assumptions. The most common, and probably 
the most compelling, is that warraranties are used as incentive devices in the presence 
of moral hazard problems. Boot et al. (1991) show that if the returns from the project 
that is financed depend, at least in part, on the degree of effort provided by the 
borrower – which is unobservable by the bank – and riskier applicants have a higher 
return from effort, then it is optimal for the bank to require a warranty from the riskier 
borrowers in order to limit moral hazard. Similarly, a moral hazard problem lies at the 
root of the results in Bester (1994), who shows that when the lender cannot credibly 
commit to forcing the bankruptcy of a borrower who cheats on the outcome of his 
investment, not repaying his debt, a warranty can be used to make the strategic default 
less attractive, therefore forcing the borrower to truly report his status. Because in 
equilibrium the incentives to strategically default are negatively correlated with 
project risk, banks will grant secured loans to riskier borrowers.  
John et al. (2002) point to a different implication of the agency problems 
between managers and claimholders. Building on the seminal paper of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), they show that if, in the event of default, the value of the assets 
posted as collateral is more stable than that of the other assets owned by the firm, 
managers have a stronger incentive to perk-consume secured than unsecured 
properties. As a result, equilibrium yields will be higher on collateralized than on 
uncollateralized debt, in order to compensate for the greater risk of “asset 
substitution”. 
Other authors have developed models where a positive relationship between 
borrowers’ riskiness and the presence of warranties does not depend on moral hazard 
                                                                                                                                           
4 For a recent survey of the theoretical literature on the role of collateral in banking, see Coco 
(2000). 
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problems. Coco (1999), for example, shows that, even with ex-ante asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), if 
borrowers are heterogeneous in their degree of risk aversion and those more risk 
averse are less willing to provide warranty, a screening equilibrium where guarantees 
are used as a signaling device is not possible and only risky borrowers may be 
requested to post collateral. de Meza and Southey (1996) show that when the 
population is composed of a number of overoptimistic borrowers, projects backed by 
high warranties are more likely to default. Finally, Barro (1976) shows that if the 
value of the warranty on bank loans is stochastic, and borrowers strategically default 
when its realization is lower than the sum of the value of the loan and its service, the 
equilibrium interest rate on secured loans is higher than that on unsecured loans, 
implying a positive correlation between risk and warranty. As suggested by Coco 
(1999), the same result can be explained by the presence of a ceiling on bank interest 
rates, for example due to usury laws. 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
The heterogeneity of results of the theoretical literature is shared only in part by the 
results of the empirical studies. Moreover, it is completely at odd with the 
conventional wisdom among bankers, who believe that banks typically require 
warranties on loans made to riskier borrowers.5 
Some authors have checked whether secured loans have characteristics that 
plausibly signal them as riskier, considering a large number of variables.6 The neatest 
result is that loans of longer duration are more likely to be secured, as found by Boot 
et al. (1991) and Harhoff and Körting (1998). With respect to the size of loans and 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Morsman (1986). 
6 With a few exception (e.g., John et al., 2002), the theoretical literature does not distinguish 
between borrowers’ and loans’ riskiness. By contrast, the empirical literature takes account of loan-
specific characteristics (e.g., size and duration), which are likely to affect credit risk for any given 
borrower.  
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borrowers, the results are less clear-cut. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Elsas and 
Kranen (2000) find a higher incidence of securitization on larger loans – as one would 
expect considering that they typically entail a higher risk for the bank – but Boot et al. 
(1991) find a lower incidence. Beger and Udell (1995) find a positive relationship 
between the size of borrowing firms, measured by their total assets, and the 
probability that their lines of credit will be secured, and Harhoff and Körting (1998), 
proxying size with the firm’s workforce, also find a positive relationship with the 
presence of warranties. On the other hand, the results of Elsas and Kranen (2000), 
showing a negative relationship between the presence of warranties and borrowers’ 
total sales, are more in line with the conventional wisdom that smaller borrowers 
entail higher risk.7 Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find that the share of secured 
loans decreases with the number of banking relationships, possibly because multi-
banking wipes out the incentives to monitor borrowers’ behavior or to require 
warranties of firms in financial distress, as suggested by Rajan and Winton (1995). 
Finally, Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) show that loans to 
borrowers with longer lending relationships – typically considered to be less risky – 
are less likely to be secured.8 However, Elsas and Kranen (2000), using data from a 
survey of German banks, find that housebanks are more likely to have secured loans.9  
Probably the most compelling results on the relationship between risk and 
warranties are those testing for differences in the interest rate spreads on secured 
versus unsecured loans. In a seminal contribution, using data from the FED survey on 
Terms of Bank Lending, Berger and Udell (1990) show that the interest rates on 
                                                 
7 These differences may be due to the fact that the size of the borrower is related to his overall 
creditworthiness, which implies a negative relationship, but also reflects availability of assets to post as 
collateral, which implies a positive relationship. 
8 These results are consistent with the predictions of Boot and Thakor (1994), who show that an 
optimal contract implies that credit conditions become more favorable late in the relationship, after the 
borrower has already his ability to fulfill his obligations. 
9 Elsas and Khranen (2000) justify their result with the argument made by Welch (1997) and 
Longhofer and Santos (2000), who show that it is optimal for bank debt to be more senior when lending 
relationships are stronger. 
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secured loans are on average higher than those on unsecured loans. This result has 
two major implications: that secured loans are typically made to borrowers considered 
ex-ante riskier by banks, and that the presence of warranties is insufficient to offset 
such higher credit risk. Berger and Udell (1995) confirm this result using data on 
credit-lines from the same source. John et al. (2002), considering a sample of over 
1,000 public issues of fixed-rate straight debt made between 1993 and 1995, find that 
yield on collateralized debt is higher than on general debt, even after controlling for 
credit ratings. Casolaro et al. (2002), studying a large sample of syndicated credit 
facilities between 1990 and 2001, also find that secured loans have larger interest rate 
spreads than unsecured loans.10 
3.Hypotheses under scrutiny and empirical modeling 
The theoretical literature yields straight testable hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the riskiness of borrowers and loans and the presence of 
warranties. From the discussion above it is clear that when warranties are used in 
order to address adverse selection problems engendered by information asymmetries, 
their presence should have no relationship with the borrowers’ default risk, because 
this information is not asymmetric. On the other hand, if warranties are used mainly 
to provide incentives to riskier borrowers in the face of moral hazard problems – and 
riskier applicants have a higher return from effort – their presence should be 
positively correlated with ex-ante measures of borrowers’ default risk.  
Two strictly related empirical models are used in order to test these 
hypotheses.11 The first directly verifies the relationship between ex-ante publicly 
                                                 
10 Harhoff and Körting (1998), on the contrary, using data from a survey of small and medium-
sized German firms, find that the interest rates on secured loans are lower than those on secured loans. 
11 These models are derived from very simple theoretical assumptions. Disregarding agency 
problems, bank profits, πB, are an increasing function of the interest rate, R, of the value of guarantees, 
C, and of the probability of repayment, p: πB = f(R, C, p) with f΄R, f΄C,  f΄p > 0. Assuming zero profits in 
the banking sector, the previous expression implies: i) a positive relationship between the presence of 
collateral and loan riskiness (measured by one minus the probability of repayment), controlling for the 
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available information on borrowers’ default risk and the presence of warranties on 
their bank loans, thus discriminating between adverse selection and moral hazard 
theories of secured lending. The second singles out the direct effect of the presence of 
warranties on credit risk, by comparing the interest rates on secured and unsecured 
loans made by different banks to the same borrower. Clearly, this measure is 
untouched by the indirect effect on interest rates originating from the differences in 
the characteristics of borrowers with secured and unsecured loans. 
An important distinction to be made when testing the relationship between risk 
and collateralization is whether the collateral is owned by the borrower (inside 
collateral) or by an external grantor (outside collateral). As pointed out by Berger and 
Udell (2000), inside collateral simply reorders creditor priority in case of bankruptcy, 
giving secured lenders a specific claim on the pledged assets. By contrast, outside 
collateral is similar to an infusion of equity by the grantor, because it exposes him to 
the potential losses of the business. 
The relationship between collateralization and borrower and loan riskiness 
differs depending on whether inside or outside collateral is provided. The theoretical 
literature shows that inside collateral is not a good signaling device, because it does 
not increase the potential loss for the borrower if he gets bankrupt. The only exception 
is if the pledge of his assets results in a welfare or profit loss for the borrower, for 
example because this limits his possibility to dispose of the assets in order to pursue 
new investment opportunities (as suggested by Smith and Warner, 1979) or for perk 
consumption (as suggested by John et al., 2000). A similar argument applies to 
collateral used as a tool to limit moral hazard on the part of borrowers. Therefore, any 
relationship between risk and the presence of collateral – , independent on whether 
positive or negative – can be expected to be stronger in the case of outside collateral. 
                                                                                                                                           
interest rate; ii) a negative relationship between the level of the interest rate and the value of collateral, 
controlling for loan riskiness. Agency problems alter the previous relationship by introducing indirect 
effects, with the probability of default being made dependent on the presence of collateral: p = g(C) 
with g΄C > 0 or g΄C < 0 depending on the mechanism at work. 
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Unfortunately, the distinction between internal and external collateral has not 
been considered adequately in the empirical literature, mainly because of the 
unavailability of data discriminating between the two types. 
A further distinction, which is partly related to that between internal and 
external collateral, is between real and personal warranties. Real warranties 
(collateral) are typically physical assets or equities that the lender can sell if the 
borrower defaults, while personal warranties (guarantees) are contractual obligations 
of third parties to make payments if the borrower defaults (e.g., a suretyship). As 
pointed out by Berger and Udell (2000), guarantees typically operate like external 
collateral, only that they do not give control over specific assets but represent a 
generic claim on the entire wealth of the grantor, who thus has a large degree of 
freedom in using and possibly neglecting it. 
The potentially different role of real and personal warranties depends on the 
outcome of two opposing forces. Collateral is potentially more powerful, because it is 
less easy to dispose of, but if it is inside, it does not increase the value of assets that 
the lender can withhold in case of default. Guarantees are less powerful because they 
can be more easily disposed of, but they are more powerful because they can only be 
external. An a priori ranking of these two effects is impossible; which one will 
dominate is therefore an empirical issue. The empirical analysis that follows does not 
discriminate between inside and outside guarantees, because this information is not 
available, but makes a distinction between real and personal warranties. 
As anticipated above, the first model directly verifies the borrower and loan 
characteristics most often associated with secured lending, controlling for the interest 
rate on the loan. Two sets of control variables are included in the regression, 
describing the characteristics of the borrowers and of the lending relationship. The 
first set consists of a measure of each borrower’s probability of default, other 
characteristics that might influence his riskiness (such as his share of physical over 
total assets and the number of his banking relationships) and proxies for the degree of 
information available on his creditworthiness (e.g. firm size and age). The second set 
consists of measures of loan-specific riskiness (such as its size) and the strength of the 
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lending relationship (e.g. its duration). In order to control for characteristics specific 
to the lenders, dummy variables for each bank are introduced. In practice, the 
following discrete choice specification is assumed: 
Pr (Yij  = g) = f (Xij,Wj,Zi,Kj) g = 0, 1, 2 (1) 
where: Yij equals 0 if the loan made by bank i to borrower j is unsecured, 1 if it is 
secured with real but not personal guarantees, 2 if it is secured with personal 
guarantees; Xij is a vector of variables specific to the bank-borrower relationship; Wj is 
a vector of characteristics of the borrower; Zi is a vector of bank-specific dummies; 
and Kj is a vector of dummy variables for the borrower’s branch of economic activity 
and geographic location. The adoption of a discrete choice model is justified by the 
fact that the value of the collateral pledged on each loan is not significant information: 
except for very few cases, loans are either fully secured or unsecured.12 Equation (1) 
is estimated using a multinomial logit specification. 
The second model, inspired by Berger and Udell (1990), provides an indirect 
test of the relationship between riskiness and the presence of warranties. In particular, 
it verifies whether, controlling for borrower and loan riskiness, the interest rates on 
secured loans are systematically different from those on unsecured loans. Clearly, as 
discussed above, a negative relationship between interest rates and the presence of 
warranties is to be expected, because the lender’s loss in case of default is reduced by 
the value of the collateral. 
This second model is tested with a regression of each bank loan on two 
dummies, taking the value of 1 the loan is secured with real or personal guarantees, 
respectively: 
iij  = f(Sij, Xij, Zi, Wj)  (2) 
                                                 
12 See, in particular, Section 4 and Table 1. 
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where iij is the interest rate on the loan made by bank i to borrower j; Sij are two 
dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the loan is secured, respectively, with real 
and personal guarantees and 0 otherwise; Xij is a vector of variables describing 
characteristics of the lending relationship; Zi is a vector of bank-specific dummy 
variables; Wj is a vector of borrower-specific dummy variables.  
4.Data and summary statistics 
The empirical analysis uses information on lines of credit to a large sample of Italian 
non-financial firms. The data are taken from three sources: banks’ supervisory reports 
to the Bank of Italy (segnalazioni di vigilanza), the Central Credit Register (Centrale 
dei Rischi) and the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci).13 The first 
source is used for data on banks’ balance sheets. The second contains information on 
single bank loans, the interest rates charged and the value of the assets pledged as 
warranties (distinguishing between real and personal); loans are recorded only when 
they are above a threshold level of ITL 150 million (around €75,000). The third 
source contains balance sheet information on a large number of non-financial 
enterprises. In particular, it includes a measure of the risk profile of the borrower – 
obtained, following Altman et al. (1994), as a numerical score from two discriminant 
functions – accessible to all banks affiliated with the Company Accounts Data 
Service. According to their score, firms are grouped into seven classes, from low risk 
(high security) to high risk (risk of bankruptcy).14 Data for 1997 from the Central 
Credit Register have been used. In order to avoid simultaneity problems, lagged 
averages of the balance sheet information of the borrowers between 1993 and 1996 
have been used. 
                                                 
13 For a detailed description of the banks’ supervisory reports to the Bank of Italy, the Central 
Credit Register and the Company Accounts Data Service see also Pagano et al. (1998). 
14 For a similar classification, see Sapienza (2003).  
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Tables 1-3 introduce the summary statistics for data from the sample of bank 
loans obtained by merging the information from the Central Credit Register and the 
Company Accounts Data Service. Table 1 presents some basic statistics by type of 
warranty. Loans secured with collateral are 2.1 per cent of all lines of credit; those 
secured with guarantees are 5.4 per cent.15 The mode of the ratios of the value of the 
warranty to that of the loan is zero in all cases.16 The value is 0 at the 95th percentile 
for collateral and 94.6 for guarantees; it is 99.4 per cent for collateral at the 99th 
percentile. These statistics show clearly that, when present, warranties normally cover 
the full amount of the loan. The requirement of warranties that cover only partially the 
value of the loan, which is largely suggested by the theoretical literature, seems to be 
irrelevant from an empirical point of view.17 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the ratio of the value of warranties to 
that of loans, with a breakdown by type of warranty, size of the lending bank, 
geographical area of activity and size of the borrower. The ratio of the overall value of 
collateral to that of loans is 5.2 per cent; it is 7.2 per cent for guarantees.18 Larger 
banks make less recourse to collateral, and make a wider use of guarantees. Small 
borrowers have a larger share of loans covered by collateral, while the differences are 
smaller for guarantees. Finally, the share of secured loans shows a high variability 
across geographical areas. 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, information is only available on whether a guarantee is posted on a given banking 
relationship, but not on which loan is actually secured. In order to avoid attributing a guarantee to an 
unsecured line of credit made to a borrower that has another type of secured loan with the same bank 
(e.g., a term loan), banking relationships involving loans other than lines of credit are excluded from 
the sample used to construct Tables 1-3. On the contrary, they are included in the data used in the 
econometric analysis. 
16 For guarantees exceeding the value of the loan, the latter value has been used in the numerator. 
17 In fact, it is to be expected that when the warranty does not cover the full value it is either 
because the price of assets pledged has fallen in the meantime or because guarantees have also been 
provided. In the case of guarantees, for which this information is available, it is often found that their 
value exceeds that of the loan. 
18 These ratios are larger than those referring to the number of secured and unsecured loans, 
showing that larger loans are on average more likely to be secured. 
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Table 3 presents the breakdown by branch of economic activity of the borrower. 
The ratio of the value of collateral to that of loans ranges from 0.0 per cent for 
communication services to 10.5 per cent for rubber and plastic products. 
Corresponding ratios for guarantees ranges from 0.0 per cent for communication 
services to 16.0 per cent for construction. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Guarantees and ex-ante riskiness of borrowers 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimates of the probability of loans being secured, 
distinguishing between the cases when only real guarantees are posted and when 
personal guarantees are present. 
Estimates are performed on a sample of 52,359 loans; bank dummies and 
dummies for the area and the sector of activity of the borrower, included in the 
regression, are not reported in order to save space. The test for the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), verifying that the multinomial logit framework is to be 
preferred to standard binomial logit regressions, is unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that the remaining alternative is irrelevant in the choice of whether or not to post 
collateral or a guarantee, respectively, on the loan.19 The pseudo R-squared of the 
regression is 0.09. 
In the case of collateral, the coefficient of the score on the borrower’s 
probability of default is not significantly different from zero. This result is potentially 
consistent with models motivating the use of warranties with adverse selection 
problems, which imply no relationships between warranties and information available 
ex-ante to lenders, such as the score. By contrast, it is not consistent with the 
                                                 
19 The test is an application of the Hausman specification test and verifies whether removing one 
option from the set of choices available (i.e., considering two separate logit regressions) systematically 
changes the parameter estimates; it is distributed as a χ2 with as many degrees of freedom as parameters 
to be estimated (see Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
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hypothesis that collateral is used as an incentive device in the presence of moral 
hazard problems, as in Boot et al. (1991). 
Although the supposition cannot be directly verified, the absence of a 
significant relationship between ex-ante riskiness and the presence of collateral is 
probably due to the fact that collateral is mainly represented by assets internal to the 
borrowing firm. As such, it does not increase the loss suffered in case of default, and 
therefore has little effect on borrowers’ incentives.  
A justification for the use of collateral, consistent with the absence of a 
relationship with borrower’s riskiness but not based on adverse selection problems, is 
that it provides a priority to some creditors; in case of default, a bank whose loan is 
secured with an internal warranty is more likely than other lenders to recover its 
assets. 
The positive and significant coefficients of the length of the lending relationship 
and of the dummy variable for companies that are more than 20 years old are indeed 
consistent with the hypothesis that collateral is used to provide a priority. Moreover, 
they are consistent with the argument made by Longhofer and Santos (2000), that 
borrowers have an incentive to post collateral when lending relationships are stronger, 
because in this case banks are more inclined to help them in situations of financial 
distress.20 Furthermore, one can expect that the need to put a specific creditor in a 
better position than others is likely to be lower when the borrower owns a large share 
of assets that can be withheld in the event of default. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the coefficient of the borrower’s share of physical over total assets is 
negative and significantly different from zero in the case of collateral. 
                                                 
20 Welch (1997) also suggests that because banks are better equipped to contest priority in financial 
distress, it is more efficient to give them higher seniority ex-ante. Extending this argument, one could 
say that banks with a stronger lending relationship are also in a better position than others to contest 
priority. 
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In the case of guarantees, the coefficient of the score on the borrowers’ 
probability of default is positive, and significantly different from zero. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that banks use guarantees as incentives, in the presence 
of moral hazard problems. On the other hand, it is not consistent with the hypothesis 
that banks use guarantees in order to address adverse selection problems. 
Additional evidence of the fact that ex-ante riskier borrowers are more likely to 
be granted loans secured with guarantees is given by the negative and significant 
coefficients of the length of the lending relationship and of the dummy variable for 
companies that are more than 20 years old. In fact, older borrowers and those with a 
longer lending relationship are typically less risky, because they have a longer record 
– public and bank-specific – on which their expected performance can be judged. 
The coefficients of the other control variables, with few exceptions, are 
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature. 
Larger loans typically imply a higher credit risk for the bank. Table 4 shows that 
the coefficient of loan size is positive for both collateral and guarantees, confirming 
that real and personal warranties are used to reduce credit risk. 
If warranties were used to give some creditors a better position in case of 
default, one would expect a positive coefficient of the number of banking 
relationships. In fact, the estimated coefficient is negative and significantly different 
from zero for both real and personal guarantees. As suggested by Rajan and Winton 
(1995), this apparently counterintuitive result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
banks are unwilling to require a warranty on their loans if this has the side effect of 
making the result of their screening activity implicitly available to competing lenders. 
Loans to larger borrowers are more likely to be secured with guarantees and less 
likely to be secured with collateral. These results are likely to be the effect of 
opposing forces. On one side, a number of factors suggest that larger borrowers 
should be less likely to have secured loans. For example, they have more market 
power than smaller debtors when contracting loan conditions and they are normally 
less risky, because they are more subject to market’s scrutiny and their balance sheets 
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data are more easily available to outside observers. On the other side, smaller 
borrowers have a better ability to establish sound lending relationships, which often 
make it unnecessary to require warranties. Moreover, larger borrowers, which often 
belong to groups, are likely to have lower costs in using guarantees, because these are 
provided by the holding company or its subsidiaries.  
Finally, the coefficient of the interest rate is positive in the case of collateral and 
negative for guarantees; in both cases it is significantly different from zero. The 
positive correlation between interest rates and the presence of collateral is probably 
due to a common factor, not adequately controlled for, driving both variables. A likely 
candidate is unobservable risk, coming from banks’ private information about their 
borrowers’ characteristics. In the following section this issue will be addressed in 
greater detail.21 
5.2 Ex-ante riskiness of secured vs. unsecured loans 
The results of the estimates verifying the borrower and loan characteristics most often 
associated with secured lending provide evidence in favor of the hypotheses that 
collateral is used primarily to provide a priority to some creditors over others, 
probably because it is largely internal, while guarantees, which are necessarily 
external, are used as an incentive device to reduce moral hazard problems. 
The estimates of the model in equation (2), reported in Table 5, provide some 
additional evidence on the effect of warranties on loan riskiness. Clearly, a major 
problem in estimating the effect of warranties on a loan’s interest rate is the potential 
                                                 
21 Clearly, the presence of an uncontrolled common factor might also bias the estimates of the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables (see Yatchew and Griliches, 1985, for a discussion of 
specification problems in discrete choice models). In particular, the bias should be positive for the 
coefficient of the borrower’s probability of default, which is likely to be positively correlated with 
unobserved risk. As such, the effect of the score, the observable measure of borrowers’ risk, would 
partly incorporate unobservable risk too. The bias should instead be negative for all the other 
coefficients, because loan’s value, relationship length, company’s age, number of banking relationship, 
borrower’s total sales and borrower’s share of physical to total assets are all likely to be negatively 
correlated with unobservable risk.  
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endogeneity; it is likely that riskier borrowers not only have higher interest rates but 
are required to back their loans with a warranty. If riskiness was not adequately 
controlled for (for example because banks have private information), this would lead 
to a positive relationship between interest rates and the presence of guarantees, a 
result in fact found by the vast majority of the empirical studies.22  
In order to take care of the endogeneity problem, the regression presented in 
Table 5 controls for borrower and lender-specific characteristics, by introducing bank 
and firm-specific dummies, as well as for some characteristics specific to each 
lending relationship (its duration and the size of the loan). With this procedure, made 
possible by the large number of multiple relationships that distinguish the Italian 
banking system,23 borrowers’ characteristics – including unobservable risk – are 
perfectly controlled for.  
The results show that, controlling better for borrower and loan riskiness than 
was possible in previous empirical studies, the presence of warranties reduces the 
interest rate on bank loans. In Table 5 both coefficients of the dummy variables for 
secured loans are negative and significantly different from zero. 
This result is quite novel to the literature, but it is not unexpected: controlling 
for borrowers’ risk, the first order effect of the presence of a warranty is to reduce the 
loss for the lender in case of default.24 In fact theoretical explanations of a positive 
relationship between warranties and the interest rate charged build on the assumption 
that their presence has unobservable effects on loan riskiness. Controlling better for 
loan riskiness, it is therefore to be expected that the intuitive negative relationship 
between warranties and the interest rate is recovered.  
Clearly, even when borrower-specific fixed effects are introduced, the control 
for loan riskiness is far from perfect, because the amount of private information on a 
                                                 
22 As mentioned above, one notable exception is Harhoff and Körting (1998). 
23 On this issue see, in particular, Ongena and Smith (2000) and Detragiache et al. (2000). 
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borrower (and therefore his perceived riskiness) is idiosyncratic to each bank, hence 
to each lending relationship. However, the presence of unmeasured loan riskiness 
introduces a positive bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the dummies for the 
presence of warranties. In its absence, the negative coefficients reported in Table 5 
should be even larger in absolute value. 
6.Conclusions 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper sheds some new light on the 
determinants of banks’ secured lending, partly reconciling academic research and the 
conventional wisdom of practitioners. 
Using unique data on lending relationships it has been possible: first, to 
discriminate between adverse selection and moral hazard theories of secured lending, 
by verifying the relationship between ex-ante publicly available information on 
borrowers’ default riskiness and the presence of warranties on their bank loans; 
second, to single out the direct effect on credit risk of the presence of warranties, by 
comparing the interest rates charged on secured and unsecured loans made by 
different banks to a same borrower. 
The evidence presented is consistent with the view that collateral and 
guarantees have a different role in loan contracts. Collateral is mainly internal and is 
therefore used essentially to provide a priority to some creditors with respect to 
others. On the other hand, it is less likely to be used as an incentive device in the 
presence of moral hazard problems, as the latter case would imply a positive 
relationship between their presence and borrowers’ ex-ante riskiness, which is not 
found. Still, the presence of internal warranties reduces banks’ credit risk, as is shown 
by the fact that, once other sources of riskiness are adequately controlled for, secured 
loans are charged lower interest rates. 
                                                                                                                                           
24 See the discussion in footnote 11. 
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Guarantees, which are mainly external, are typically used as incentive devices in 
the presence of moral hazard problems. They are more likely to be found in loans 
made to borrowers with an ex-ante higher probability of default. Like collateral, 
guarantees reduce credit risk, as is shown by the fact that secured loans are charged 
lower interest rates. 
 Table 1 
Secured loans: summary statistics 
(percentage values) 
 
Collateral is typically represented by physical assets or equities; guarantees are contractual obligations 
of third parties to make payments in case of default of the borrower, such as a suretyship. Due to the 
absence of information on the type of loan that is secured with guarantees, banking relationships 
involving loans other than lines of credit are excluded. Source: Italy’s Bank Credit Register, 1997. 
 
 Collateral Guarantees 
   
Share of secured loans 2.1 5.4 
Value at 95th percentile 0 94.6 
Value at 99th percentile 99.4 100 
 
 
Table 2 
Value of warranties relative to that of total loans by duration,  
size of the lending bank, geographical area and type of warranty 
(percentage values) 
 
Ratio of the value of warranties to that of total loans in the class. For warranties exceeding the value of 
the loan, the latter value has been used in the numerator. For variable and sample definitions, see also the 
note to table 1. Source: Italy’s Bank Credit Register, 1997. 
 Collateral Guarantees 
   
Bank size   
Below 20th percentile 8.3 6.7 
Between 20th and 40th percentile 6.9 6.6 
Between 40th and 60th percentile 5.5 7.4 
Between 60th and 80th percentile 3.4 7.4 
Above 80th percentile 3.0 9.1 
Borrower size   
Below 20th percentile 9.2 7.7 
Between 20th and 40th percentile 7.6 6.3 
Between 40th and 60th percentile 6.7 6.1 
Between 60th and 80th percentile 6.8 8.1 
Above 80th percentile 2.9 6.2 
Area   
North-West 6.3 5.9 
North-East 6.3 7.7 
Center 2.7 7.8 
South 6.7  9.7 
Islands 4.6 6.1 
Total 5.2 7.2 
Table 3 
Value of warranties relative to that of total loans  
by branch of economic activity of the borrower 
(percentage values) 
 
Ratio of the value of warranties to that of total loans in the class. For waranties exceeding the value of the 
loan, the latter value has been used in the numerator. For variable and sample definitions, see also the 
note to table 1. Source: Italy’s Bank Credit Register, 1997. 
Branch of activity Collateral Guarantees 
Agriculture 2.8 13.4 
Energy 0.6 1.8 
Food and tobacco products 7.5 4.4 
Textiles 8.2 3.9 
Leather and footwear 5.6 10.3 
Wood and furniture 6.9 2.2 
Paper and publishing 3.4 7.4 
Chemicals 3.8 2.5 
Rubber and plastic products 10.5 5.7 
Metallurgy  4.1 11.3 
Metals 4.8 7.2 
Machinery for ind. and agr. 6.4 8.6 
Electrical machinery 2.0 5.0 
Motor-cars and other transp. eq. 1.1 4.6 
Other manufactures 7.5 1.2 
Construction 8.7 16.0 
Commerce 5.0 5.0 
Hotels 6.5 8.6 
Transports 3.7 7.9 
Communication 0.0 0.0 
Other services 5.2 8.0 
 
 Table 4 
Determinants of secured lending  
The dependent variable equals 0 if the loan is unsecured, 1 if it is secured with collateral and 2 if it is 
secured with guarantees (see footnote 1 and equation 1 in the text). Borrowers’ total sales are four years 
averages between 1992 and 1996. Geographical, sector and bank dummies, not reported, are included in 
the regression. For variable and sample definitions, see also the note to table 1. The test for independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is distributed as a chi-squared under the null hypothesis of no systematic 
differences between logit and multinomial logit estimate, with as many degrees of freedom as parameters 
to be estimated. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent level. ** at 5 per cent and * at 10 per cent. 
 
Collateral 
 
 
Guarantees 
 
Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Std err.  Std err.  
   
-0.01   0.04 *** Risk 
(index) 0.02 0.01 
0.72 *** 0.15 *** Loan’s value 
(logs – millions of lire) 0.03 0.01 
0.17 *** -0.14 *** Relationship length 
(log – years) 0.04 0.03 
0.09 * -0.38 *** Borrower’s age 
(dummy variable) 0.06 0.04 
-0.05 *** -0.01 *** Number of banking relationships 
0.01 0.00 
-0.47 *** 0.11 *** Borrower’s total sales 
(logs – millions of lire) 0.03 0.02 
-0.70 *** -0.04   Borrower’s share of physical to 
total assets  0.15 0.13 
0.06 *** -0.02 *** Loan interest rate 
0.01 0.01 
   
Test of IIA (p-value) 0.00 1.00 4.78 0.99 
No. of observations 52,359 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 
 
Table 5 
Warranties and interest rates on bank loans 
The dependent variable is the level of the interest rate on the loan. Bank and borrower dummies, not 
reported, are included. For the definition of the variables and of the sample, see also the note to tables 1 
and 4. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent level, ** at 5 per cent and * at 10 per cent. 
   
  Coef. Sign. 
 
VARIABLES 
  Std. Err.  
    
 -0.59 *** Collateral 
(dummy variable) 0.09 
 -0.11 * Guarantees  
(dummy variable) 0.08 
 -0.30 *** Loan’s value 
(logs – millions of lire) 0.01 
 0.43 *** Relationship length 
(log – years) 0.03 
  
No. of observations  67,829 
Adjusted R-squared  0.50 
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